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Is the Foucauldian Conception of Disciplinary Power still at Work in Contemporary 
forms of Imprisonment?  
Craig W. J. Minogue, La Trobe University 
 
ABSTRACT: In this article I will identify the position from which I write and the methodo-
logy I will employ, and then I will ask: ‛Is the Foucauldian conception of disciplinary power 
still at work in contemporary forms of imprisonment?‛  I will answer this question in the affir-
mative and report the results of a case study of the operational philosophy of a contemporary 
prison in Melbourne Australia while highlighting some key comparative points from Disci-
pline and Punish.  How prisoners resist and subvert disciplinary power by turning an inclusive 
grouping within the prison into a site from which they highly differentiate Self from Other 
will be touched upon.  I will conclude by finding that homo criminalis has in fact become a 
definite object in the field of knowledge and he is emerging as a product from the machine for 
altering minds.1  
 
Keywords: Margnoneet, a machine for altering minds.  
 
My research is undertaken from a particular engaged perspective, and it is, in part, about my 
personal experience in prison in one state in Australia.  Many researchers undertake their task 
with the status of an ‛an unpaid staff member with an official position, that of researcher 
[with] a staff badge.‛2  I am not a privileged actor with a ‚staff badge‛ and the freedom to 
roam around the prison at my own self directed will.  My piece of plastic identifies me as a 
‘Prisoner’ and it limits my freedom, it does not open doors, rather it closes doors, for as a pri-
soner I am a person against whom disciplinary power is directed.3  I am not researching in the 
                                                 
1 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, translated by Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin 
Books, 1991), 125. 
2 Fred C. Alford, ‚What Would It Matter If Everything Foucault Said About Prison Were Wrong? Discipline 
and Punish After Twenty Years,‛ Theory and Society, vol. 29, no. 1, (2000), 125-146. 
3 Craig Minogue, ‚The engaged specific intellectual: resisting unethical prison tourism and the hubris of the 
objectifying modality of the universal intellectual,‛ Journal of Prisoners on Prisons, vol. l8, no. 1 & 2 (2009), l29-
l42.   
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field of criminology, ‘convict’ or otherwise.  Rather my research is in the field of applied ethics 
with a ontological focus on the orthodox evaluation of how understandings of Self and Other 
emerge though the specific discourse associated with the power to punish.4    
 Critics have argued that Michel Foucault’s history and analysis in Discipline and Punish 
is representative of an ideal theory of disciplinary power and its manifestation in mass im-
prisonment, but that it is an ideal that is divorced from the reality of the contemporary prison 
and disciplinary praxis.5  Writing from a North American perspective, researchers like David 
Garland and Fred Alford say that in the contemporary era they have not found any of the 
main elements of disciplinary power as Michel Foucault frames it in omnipresent ‛surveil-
lance, categorisation, classification, the time-table, [and] non-idleness‛ which are aimed at re-
shaping the subjectivity of the delinquent.6  Karl von Schriltz argues that Michel Foucault tor-
tured history to punish capitalism and that the historical record of the eighteenth century does 
not support the development of the prison as the primary punishment and the creation of 
useful bodies by disciplinary power.  In short, Karl von Schriltz argues that Michel Foucault is 
simply wrong about everything.7  
                                                 
4 This case study is part of my research for a PhD in applied ethics at La Trobe University in Melbourne Au-
stralia.  Through a Foucauldian genealogical analysis, I have traced an immoral normative discourse sur-
rounding crime and punishment through which a carceral understanding of a good Self emerges which is 
literally murderously oppositional to the bad Other as that is manifested in vigilantism.  In my thesis I argue 
this murderously oppositional understanding of Self and Other is maintained by the norms of, and resis-
tance to, Michel Foucault’s conception of disciplinary power.  I am re-mapping how the coherence of disci-
plinary power as a tactic is responded to by: the delinquents themselves; the law abying populace; those 
empowered to deliver a learned discourse about such matters; and finally what practical effect all this has on 
the present emergent understandings of Self and Other as being in a state of violent dichotomy. 
5 Alford. David Garland, Punishment and modern society: A study in social theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1990).  Philip Smith, Punishment and Culture (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
6 Alford, 126.  In this paper I will refer to people by their full proper names, for as Paul Ricoeur says in his 
seminal Oneself as Another: ‛The privilege accorded the proper names assigned to humans has to do with 
their subsequent role in confirming their identity and their selfhood.‛ See Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another 
(Chicago: Chicago Press, 1992), 29.  In most academic disciplines it is common practice to refer to one’s fel-
lows in professional journals and other written work by the collegial use of second names only.  This practice 
is no doubt a kind of shorthand, but it is also a type of elitism and thus a language of exclusion.  Nor does 
‘discipline’ end in the academy, as a verb the word ‘discipline’ means the practice of imposing obedience 
and punishment on another person, this discipline is a personal rebuke and in these types of disciplinary 
systems the person who is rebuked is most often stripped of his or her social and human character and 
objectivised in a way to suit the particular disciplinary project, be that the prison, the military or other total 
institutions like English public schools.  My academic discipline is that of the humanities, of philosophy, ap-
plied ethics and morality, I write however from within the physical discipline of the prison and the loss of 
the honorific Mr. and the loss of one’s first name is not at all a collegial experience for me, but an excluding, 
objectivising and dehumanizing one.  Reference to people by their family names only is read by me as an 
objectifying and oppressive device, a language of exclusion and a form of class elitism, for this reason I try to 
break with this particular academic tradition of such a usage whenever I can in my work.  It will be my 
practice here to use full proper names, or honorifics of the people mentioned in this work if their first name 
is unknown—perhaps as you read you will see the humanizing affect which I think this achieves. 
7 Karl von Schriltz, ‚Foucault on the Prison: Torturing History to Punish,‛ Critical Review: A Journal of Politics 
and Society, vol. 13, issue 3 & 4, (1999), 199. 
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 The discrete element of disciplinary power that I am focusing on here is that which is 
invoked by Michel Foucault’s claim that the prison would become ‚a machine for altering 
minds.‛8  So, has the prison become anything like an administrative machine for altering 
minds?  Philip Smith, David Garland, Fred Alford and Karl von Schriltz all argue that no such 
machine exists in the contemporary era and they have not found any of the main elements of 
disciplinary power (existing in combination) as Michel Foucault claimed.  In contrast I have 
found an example par excellence of an administrative machine for altering minds though omni-
present ‛surveillance, categorisation, classification, the time-table, [and] non-idleness‛ which 
are all aimed at reshaping subjectivities.9  This administrative machine is found at Marngoneet 
Correctional Centre in Lara Victoria Australia.  The policy and operation of Marngoneet is 
wholly faithful to Michel Foucault’s conception of an administrative machine for altering 
minds and shaping subjectivity to create a specific sense of Self and Other, and a hopefully 
useful, but ultimately docile body for citizenship in the carceral society of the modern world.   
 Disciplinary power is not a homogeneous entity, it is not a program with policy-like 
aims and objectives, it is a ‛coherence of a tactic.‛10  And this tactic is able to respond to acts of 
resistance and acts of allegiance, and the accompanying discourse, which emerge as part of 
this field of power relations.  This means that the prison and its praxis are not going to be the 
same from one country to another, from one time to another, or even from one prison to anot-
her.  For example, Marngoneet Correctional Centre is less than 700 metres from Barwon Prison 
and both are operated by the same entity of Corrections Victoria, but they are very different.  
The harshness of the praxis of Barwon Prison is a physical one; if a prisoner steps out of line 
there, the prison staff lay hands on him and confine him in a supermax punishment and con-
trol unit.11  At Marngoneet however the harshness of the system is about a perpetual ‛norm-
based distinction between good and bad acts as the orthodox evaluation of the humans in 
question.‛12  Michel Foucault finds that in ‛the harshest of prisons‛ the disciplinary discourse 
holds over the prisoner the inescapable reality that the custodial officer and the psychologist 
will ‛note the slightest irregularity in your conduct.‛13  And so it is at Marngoneet Correctional 
Centre.    
 I do not for a moment suggest that Marngoneet is a representative example of modern 
prison praxis, and this case study is not comparative with any other prison.  For all I know 
Marngoneet could be a unique island in the carceral archipelago, but it is the one on which I 
am marooned and from my position I can check the empirical claims of Michel Foucault’s 
conception of disciplinary power against the praxis I am personally experiencing.  
                                                 
8 Foucault, 125. 
9 Alford, 126. 
10 Foucault, 139.   
11 I have been imprisoned since 1986 and I have spent 6 years in Supermax punishment and control units.  
The situation in Supermax units is beyond the scope of this topic.   
13 John S. Ransom, Foucault’s Discipline: The Politics of Subjectivity (Durham and London: Duke University 
Press, 1997), 53. 
14 Foucault, 299. 
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 Many of the criticisms of Michel Foucault’s work are aimed at ‛his idiosyncratic brand 
of historical analysis.‛14  To read Michel Foucault as saying ‛this is the way it was, or is going 
to be‛ is to misunderstand the point of his genealogical method, for he takes a particular his-
torical and philosophical perspective, an engaged one, not an objective disinterested one.  The 
genealogy of a specific intellectual is not a work in the modality of universalism, it is a work 
situated ‘in’ the field that is being examined.  Michel Foucault’s work is an experience of a truth 
rather than an objective point by point measuring of the truth; it ‛serves as a historical 
background to various studies of the power of a normalising discourse and for the knowledge 
[about Self] in modem society.‛15  In excavating disciplinary power Michel Foucault says that 
he ‛simply intend[s] to map on a series of examples some of the essential techniques that most 
easily spread from one to another,‛ he goes on to say that he is not seeking an adjudication of 
‛meaning,‛ but a sense of the ‛coherence of a tactic.‛16  
 Any history, or set of circumstances, or archive, can be approached in a number of dif-
ferent ways; choices always need to be made for the sake of space and for the sake of a parti-
cular project having an end.  An objectively analytical approach seeks to settle the matter, to 
trace all of the currents back to their origin and in an exhaustive account, and as C.G. Prado 
says, nail the subject down as a set of ‛future-determining continuities.‛17  Alternatively the 
genealogical method seeks to identify the ‛microparticulars as components of some broader 
process rather than those particulars being exhaustive of history’s subject matter.‛18  Michel 
Foucault’s genealogical method is intimately linked to the events that it is analysing; that is, it 
provides an answer for how things are from within the events being examined.  As C.G. Prado 
has rightly said of the analytical method, the Foucauldian genealogy does not provide for 
some underlying or behind the scenes ‛guiding hand or set of regulating principles that deter-
mines how things progress and explains why the present is as it is.‛19  The Foucauldian 
method departs from analytical philosophy and the scientific method in that it is not con-
cerned with first principles or origins, or capital T truth.   
 So, to the case study of a contemporary prison which I argue is a machine for altering 
minds, and which is entirely faithful to the Foucauldian conception of disciplinary power.  
Marngoneet Correctional Centre is a medium security prison that ‛functions as a Treatment 
Community‛ though an individualised ‚Offender Management system [that] manages priso-
ners in a manner which... recognises and responds to the needs of specific prisoner groups.‛20  
The ‘Prison Profile’ is officially stated as providing ‛selected male prisoners with an intensive 
level of treatment and offender management activity to prepare for a successful crime-free 
                                                 
14 Madan Sarup, An Introductory Guide to Post-Structuralism and Post-Modernism (Athens: University of Geor-
gia Press, 1998), 391;  von Schriltz, 73. 
15 Foucault, 308. 
16 Ibid., 139. 
17 C.G. Prado, Starting with Foucault: an Introduction to Genealogy, Second Edition (Boulder: Westview Press, 
2000), 34. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Emma Cassar (document authorised by), Marngoneet Correctional Centre Operating Manual (Melbourne:   
Corrections Victoria, Department of Justice, 2007), ‚Operating Procedure No. 3.01 Offender Management,‛ 1. 
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release from prison.‛21  Preconditions for placement at Marngoneet are managed through a 
Classification system which is overseen by a Sentence Management Unit.  This process in-
cludes categorising prisoners according to a hierarchy of four levels of risk and security ra-
ting.22  To be ‛classified‛ is a prisoner’s ‛right‛ pursuant to section 47(1)(1) of the Corrections 
Act 1986.  Prisoners deemed eligible for Marngoneet are selected through an individual inter-
view and assessment process which employs a specific ‛referral criteria to inform the identi-
fication of, and timing, of individual prisoners [being sent] to the prison.‛23  Prisoners are clas-
sified to a particular treatment Neighbourhood prior to transfer.24  There are three ‛Neigh-
bourhood communities,‛ each provides a different treatment focus on, or ‛target‛ at, offen-
ding behaviours.25  The ‛targeted clinical purpose‛ of the first Neighbourhood is for ‛violent 
offenders,‛ the second for ‛drug/alcohol offenders,‛ and the third for ‚sex offenders.‛26  
 The clinical/medical services policy, which acts as an overarching modality and opera-
ting principle of Marngoneet Correctional Centre  needs to be described in detail, for as Michel 
Foucault said, the genealogical method ‛demands relentless erudition,‛ ‛from a vast accumu-
lation of source material‛ to demonstrate the depth of impact of the power relations which are 
being examined.27  
 The ‛Clinical Service Model‛ at Marngoneet is designed and operates in a co-ordinated 
way in relation to its systems of ‛assessment, management and treatment/intervention‛ which 
are aimed at ‛programs designed to reduce re-offending.‛28  Of the ‚Sexual Offender Treat-
ment‛ program the Operating Manual says it ‛is based on sound, recent theoretical know-
ledge and uses cognitive-behavioural therapy techniques.‛29  The medicalized knowledge sys-
tem for controlling offenders in the prison and beyond is made clear for ‛Marngoneet Clinical 
Service is managed by a health professional‛ and ‛staffed by suitably qualified health pro-
fessionals.‛30  No doubt all of this sounds benign and well-intentioned enough, but the depths 
of the prisoner’s soul that it seeks to chart is limitless and it all starts as part of the reception, 
orientation, integration and initial management processes when judgments are made to fix the 
prisoner in place as ‛a case‛ in the system.   
 Keep in mind the criticism that the mechanisms of disciplinary power as Michel 
Foucault conceptualised them are not found in contemporary imprisonment.  Now, imagine 
being a prisoner at Marngoneet.  On the day of arrival an initial assessment is carried out to al-
                                                 
21 Sentence Management Manual (Melbourne: Corrections Victoria, Department of Justice Victoria, 2007), Ap-
pendix I, A1.21. 
22 Corrections Regulations (Victoria Australia, 2009), rr. 22-23. 
23 Cassar, 3. 
24 Len Norman (document authorised by), Marngoneet Operating Manual (Melbourne: Corrections Victoria, 
Department of Justice, 2008), Operation Procedure 3.14, 1. 
25 Sentence Management Manual, Appendix I, A1.12. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Michel Foucault (1971), 76, 77, quoted in Prado, 40. 
28 Marlene Morison (document authorised by), Margoneet Correctional Centre Operating Manual (Melbourne: 
Corrections Victoria, Department of Justice, 2006), OP. 6.01, 2. 
29 Ibid., 6. 
30 Ibid., 12, 15. 
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locate a suitable ‛Case Manager.‛31  The Case Manager is a member of the Custodial Staff 
whose role it is to formulate a Local Management Plan (‛LMP‛) and to formally meet with the 
prisoner ‛at least once a fortnight to discuss the prisoner’s progress in working towards the 
identified goals on the LMP‛ and a list of sixteen other suggested subjects.32  Then a psy-
chologist is allocated as a ‛Treatment Manager.‛33  A ‛Custodial Assessment‛ is then under-
taken to settle the ‛specific security and day to day needs and risks of the individual prisoner, 
and appropriate accommodation placements and case management support needs.‛34  As well 
as physically confining the prisoner, much information about the prisoner is also brought 
under control.  As part of the Custodial Assessment it is expected that further ‛relevant infor-
mation‛ will be provided by the prisoner  
 
about themselves including, but not limited to, current offences, cooffenders, offending his-
tory, family relationships, visits, protection issues, daily living skills/deficits including 
literacy, interests/hobbies, participation in sporting activities, general attitudes about prison, 
reintegration and release needs, goals/aspirations and preferences for future accommodation 
within the Neighbourhood.35 
 
The Mission Statement-like slogan on framed signs around the prison read, ‛Treatment and 
Skills for Positive Futures.‛36  Prisoners need to be useful bodies.  So the next step in the initial 
processes is a ‛Vocational Services Assessment‛ which fixes in place an assessment of the per-
sonal development and educational level of the prisoner, and how that relates to their release 
preparation and their obtaining of useful employment after release.37  Before release, as a tran-
sitional strategy, employment in prison industries is linked directly to education and training 
and teachers often work in the prison factories conducting on-the-job training, which is all 
‛designed to facilitate enhanced post-release employment outcomes.‛38  The focus is clearly 
about making useful bodies.  Work in prison in Victoria is compulsory and it is a prison of-
fence to refuse to work if directed to do so.39  Work is part of ‛Training Prisoners for Capable 
Crime-free Lives,‛ so goes another Mission Statement-like slogan on framed signs in the ac-
commodation areas.40  Prisoners are provided with a small gratuity for work they are com-
pelled to perform, 20% of which is placed in a ‛Compulsory savings‛ account ‛to assist with 
post release‛ matters.41  Just as Mr. La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt proposed in 1796 and Charles 
                                                 
31 Cassar, OP 3.01, 4.  Norman, Marngoneet Operating Manual, OP. 3.02, 2. 
32 Norman, Marngoneet Operating Manual, OP. 3.02, 5-6. 
33 Cassar, OP 3.01, 6. 
34 Ibid., OP 3.01, 7. 
35 Norman, OP 3.02, 3. 
36 Personal observation (2008-2011). 
37 Cassar, OP 3.01, 7. 
38 Norman, Marngoneet Operating Manual, A.22, 2. 
39 Corrections Act (Victoria Australia, 1986), 84H. 
40 Personal observation (2008-2011). 
41 Corrections Regulations (Victoria Australia, 2009), r.31. Director’s Instructions (Victoria Australia, 2008), DI. 
4.9, 2 
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Lucas proposed in 1836.42 
 The final step in the initial round of assessments is the ‛Clinical Assessment‛ which is 
‛an information-gathering process designed to increase efficiency in identifying a prisoner’s 
treatment needs/targets and treating prisoners appropriately as part of a holistic, individuali-
sed rehabilitation plan.‛43  There are a number of stages to the clinical assessment process that 
diagnoses what contributed to the offending behaviour.  Apart from the information gained 
from the prisoner, the most important document are the sentencing comments from the judge 
which most often carries the biographical, social, medical and psychological information about 
the prisoner that was presented at the plea hearing on his behalf.  The end result of the Clinical 
Assessment process is a diagnoses/judgment of the level of risk of reoffending and the level of 
intervention needed, be that moderate or intensive.  Each identified need is categorised on a 
scale of one to five, and is formalised in the ‛Treatment Management Plan‛ which forms the 
Clinical Services part of the LMP.44  As part of these processes there are ‛Pre-and-Post-
Psychometric Testing [which is designed] to gauge the prisoner’s level of motivation, specific 
treatment needs and treatment progress.‛45  The treatment of the prisoner (management of 
‛the case‛) is quantified against scales which measure progress. 
 The ‛Custodial Assessment,‛ ‛Vocational Services Assessment‛ and the ‛Clinical As-
sessment‛ constitute the ‚Whole of Services Assessment.‛46  The ‚Whole of Services Assess-
ment‛ is overseen by a ‛Review and Assessment Committee‛ which acts as the recording and 
validating mechanism which continuously reviews every prisoner’s LMP and ensures that 
‛custodial, vocational and clinical staff [all] contribute to offender management decisions.‛47  
The LMP for each prisoner, which is approved by the Review and Assessment Committee, 
consists of four elements.  The first is the ‛Accommodation Plan‛ by which ‛each prisoner’s 
placement will be assessed individually and an appropriate accommodation plan will be cus-
tomised for each prisoner’s requirements and suitability.‛48  Accommodation, or where one is 
locked up in a prison, is at the heart of disciplinary power.  Of the military/medical discipli-
nary management of the town or city under plague, Michel Foucault wrote:  
 
This enclosed, segmented space, observed at every point, in which the individuals are 
inserted in a fixed place, in which the slightest movements are supervised, in which all ele-
ments are recorded, in which an uninterrupted work of writing links the centre and peri-
phery, in which power is exercised without division, according to a continuous hierarchical 
figure, in which each individual is constantly located, examined and distributed...  all this 
constitutes a compact model of the disciplinary mechanism.49  
 
To look at Marngoneet in light of this description of disciplinary power we see that apart from 
                                                 
42 Foucault, 124, 243. 
43 Morison, OP. 6.08, 1.   
44 Cassar, OP. 3.01, 7. 
45 Morison, OP. 6.08, 2. 
46 Cassar, OP. 3.01, 6. 
47 Norman, OP. 3.09, 1. 
48 Ibid., OP. 3.14, 1. 
49 Foucault, 127. 
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each Neighbourhood having an individual treatment target, there are five types of accommo-
dation that cater to prisoners who are assessed as meeting certain personal criteria and as ha-
ving a certain level of living skills.  They are: 
 
one 40 bed unit with individual cells and meals provided by the prison kitchen (7 ‛Criteria 
for placement‛ that need to be assessed);  
 
two 6 cell lock-up units with communal cooking (5 ‛Criteria for placement‛ that need to be 
assessed).50 
 
There are communal cooking and accommodations in flat and cottage-like buildings in which 
only the one entry and exit door is locked at the end of the day.  A key and a privacy lock are 
provided for each room.  These accommodations are configured thus:  
 
two 6 bed, 2 storey flat type accommodations (4 ‛Criteria for placement‛ that need to be 
assessed);  
 
four one story 6 bed flat like accommodations (4 ‛Criteria for placement‛ that need to be 
assessed); and  
 
three 4 bed cottage like accommodations (3 ‛Criteria for placement‛ that need to be 
assessed).51  
 
The various ‛criteria for placement‛ in the differing accommodations and if prisoners meet 
these criteria or not are documented in the Accommodation Plan.52  The most desirable accom-
modation is the 4 bed cottages, and although there are only 3 criteria, they require a prisoner 
to have been judged to have the most living skills and good behaviour.  The accommodation 
placement, therefore, is a kind of hierarchical ranking system; it carries a judgement made by 
the staff about the prisoner which is a visible sign.  This ‛sign‛ can result in benefits like less 
surveillance in the most desirable accommodation, the 4 bed cottages, if the prisoner acts in a 
way that confirms the judgment that has been made about him.53  
Recall the Mission Statement-like slogans on framed signs around the prison which 
read, ‚Treatment and Skills for Positive Futures‛ and ‛Training Prisoners for Capable Crime-
free Lives.‛54  These ‛futures‛ and ‛lives’ beyond the prison are given a normative value by the 
judgments that are perpetually made about the delinquent and which act to establish a field of 
relations though which a reconceptualised sense of Self of the delinquent can emerge.  The 
normalising discourse of ‛Neighbourhoods‛ is a key element in the system.  No account of 
Foucauldian power is complete without considering how that power is resisted and subverted 
by those who have it applied to them.  As an example of resistance, rather than being an inclu-
sive and cooperative grouping of people with similar needs, interests and preferences, the 
                                                 
50 Norman, OP. 3.14, 2. 
51 Ibid., 2-4. 
52 Ibid., 2-3. 
53 Personal observation (2008-2011). 
54 Ibid. 
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geographical sign, the classification/categorisation of the Neighbourhoods in the prison, has 
been subverted by the prisoners to become sites of opposition and differentiation from Others.  
 The sex offender and protection Neighbourhood is physically separated from the vio-
lence and drug/alcohol intervention Neighbourhoods; the prisoners in these mainstream 
Neighbourhoods refer to the sex offender and protection Neighbourhood as ‛the dark side,‛ 
and the prison staff have taken up that phraseology.55  As an analogy for evil and wrongdoing, 
‛the dark side‛ is of course best known from the Star Wars series of films.  The main leitmotiv 
in the Star Wars films is the Jedi prophecy of ‛bringing balance to the Force,‛ the heroes and 
villains fight over this balance, that is of the Light and Dark Sides of the Force, that of good 
and bad (evil), or in religious terms, ‛Heaven‛ and ‛Hell.‛56  The idea of restoring the balance 
of good and bad (evil) or right and wrong in the world, or between the temporal world of 
people and eternal existence of God in heaven, is not a new one as it underpinned the sove-
reign power to punish with the offender suffering the same fate as his or her victim by pinning 
the ‛public torture on the crime itself‛ as a promulgation of the wrong done and thus annul-
ling the crime and restoring the balance.57 
 So effective are the classification, categorisation and normalization tactics of disci-
plinary power; such is the ‛coherence‛ of this ‛tactic‛ as Michel Foucault would say, that it is 
seamlessly taken up as a practice by delinquents who try to differentiate themselves from a 
particular Other and move themselves towards a conception of, and acceptance of, the agreed-
upon Self of the dominant, normalising discourse of disciplinary power.  Prisoners take on the 
labels associated with the Neighbourhood communities in which they are placed and depen-
ding on what offending behaviour the therapeutic community is targeting.  The use of the la-
bels, however, are not inclusive like one would normally understand the concepts ‚Neigh-
bourhood‛ and ‚community‛; they are normalising labels yes, but they are used by prisoners 
to differentiate their norm from the abnorm of Others, and not to include.  So, the sex offender 
treatment Neighbourhood is called ‛the dark side;‛ the drug and alcohol treatment Neigh-
bourhood is openly called, by those in the violence treatment Neighbourhood, ‚the drug 
fucked side.‛  I am in the violence treatment Neighbourhood, and I am unaware of what the 
men on the dark side or the drug fucked side call the Neighbourhood in which I am placed; 
perhaps they are reluctant to say because might is often right in the prison.58  The point here is 
that disciplinary power normalises a highly differentiated dichotomy of Self and Other.  Fou-
cauldian power is not a tool used by the State or its agent the prison, it is a field of relations 
through which the sense of Self of the delinquent emerges, or traverses.  This field is that 
which gives form to a particular political axis of individualization, it is a field of relations 
which sees one type of delinquent differentiating themselves against another type of delin-
quent.  So, not only does the institution, which is the subject of this case study, and the way it 
functions represent an example par excellence of disciplinary power, but so too does the way in 
                                                 
55 Ibid. 
56 Jason T. Eberl, ‚‘You cannot Escape Your Destiny’ (or can You?): Freedom and Predestination in the Sky-
walker Family,‛ in Star Wars and Philosophy, edited by Kevin S. Decker and Jason T. Eberl (Chicago: Open 
Court Books, 2005), 3, 7, 9.   
57 Foucault, 44-45. 
58 Personal observation (2008-2011). 
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which the delinquents have responded.  As an example of how delinquents respond to disci-
plinary power, the creation of ‛the dark side‛ and ‛the drug fucked side‛ by those in the 
violence treatment Neighbourhood, does not get any better.59  
 There is a limit to the physical confining of a body, but these systems and procedures of 
judging and shaping the Self, or the soul, of the delinquent literally have no end, just as Michel 
Foucault suggested.  So, after having judged where the prisoner is situated in the hierarchical 
ranking system of the differing accommodations, the second element of the LMP that comes 
into play is the ‚Access Plan‛ which is designed to address issues arising from access to 
certain areas by prisoners with a disability, or if there are particular safety or security risks or 
needs as in the case of a prisoner who has an escape history or who is particularly vulne-
rable.60  All of this seemingly beneficial concern and management and the institutional-ease is 
overwhelming just to read.  The prisoner however, is confined to a very small ontological 
space by all of this, he is reduced to a precise genotype by this matrix of process and specia-
lised knowledge.  For it is a ‛technique‛ of disciplinary power to section off and distribute 
space and the individuals in that space.  As Michel Foucault found, and it is worth quoting at 
length, for disciplinary power to be effective it  
 
must eliminate the effects of imprecise distributions, the uncontrolled disappearance of 
individuals, the diffuse circulation… establish presences and absences, to know where and 
how to locate individuals… to be able at each moment to supervise the conduct of each 
individual… 
 
served to economize the time of life, to accumulate it in a useful form and to exercise power 
over men through the mediation of time arranged in this way.61  
 
The newly arrived prisoner at Marngoneet is only in his second week at this point and there is 
more to do yet.  And I am sorry, but we have not yet left the elements in the LMP, for the third 
element in the LMP is the ‛Vocational Services‛ element which details how educational and 
training needs will be met to aid with employment prospects after release.62  A fourth element 
in the LMP is the ‚Clinical Services‛ which details the ‚programs designed to reduce re-
offending‛ which the prisoner has been assessed as needing to complete.63  
 All of these classifications, categorisations, assessments, treatment and vocational obli-
gations placed on prisoners need, first, to be documented and then, secondly, to be managed.  
A document trail is created at every stage of these many processes.  Almost every interaction 
is documented both electronically and in hard copy on the prisoner’s ‚Individual Manage-
ment Plan File,‛ the ‚Clinical File,‛ the ‚Psychometric Assessment Register,‛ the ‚Clinical Ser-
vices Register,‛ ‚Service Reports‛ and in many other ‚reports,‛ ‚case notes,‛ ‚case review 
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entries,‛ and ‚file notes.‛64  The uninterrupted work of writing, the living biography of the 
prisoner which establishes ‚a psychological causality‛ of Clinical Assessment and Treatment 
which duplicates ‚the judicial attribution of responsibility‛ – the judgement of disciplinary po-
wer never ends.65  In official practice, the burnt, dismembered and branded body of the offen-
der who was the subject of the infinite power of the sovereign to punish the finite body has 
disappeared.  There is nothing now that officially resembles that ‚former excess of sovereign 
power‛ in Australia at least, but in its place is a disciplinary subject who is subjected to the 
limitless power as an object of knowledge; the soul, the Self, the mind, has a limitless depth; 
and there always remains room for one more entry in the file; one new psychometric test, one 
more entry in a register.66  Recall that the Custodial Case Manager meets formally with the 
prisoner ‚at least once a fortnight to discuss the prisoner’s progress in working towards the 
identified goals on the [LMP]‛ and a list of sixteen other suggested subjects.67  It is worth 
repeating, that Michel Foucault finds that in ‚the harshest of prisons‛ the disciplinary dis-
course holds over the prisoner the inescapable reality that the prison officer and the psycho-
logist will ‚note the slightest irregularity in your conduct.‛68  And so is the harsh praxis at 
Marngoneet Correctional Centre.  Michel Foucault argues for a reading of history that at the 
birth of the modern prison, it was planned that  
 
work on the prisoner’s soul must be carried out as often as possible.  The prison, though an 
administrative apparatus, will at the same time be a machine for altering minds.69  
 
And that disciplinary power  
 
must include the procedures of writing that [make] it possible to integrate individual data 
into cumulative systems in such a way that they were not lost; so to arrange things that an 
individual could be located in the general resister and that, conversely, each datum of the 
individual examination might affect the overall calculations.70  
 
This could be taken directly from the Marngoneet Operating Procedures.   
The management of prisoner compliance to the behaviour- and mind-altering machine 
is implemented by a policy called ‚The Structured Day,‛ and the enforcement tool is called the 
‚W-IVPrisoner Activity Timetable.‛71  The Structured Day policy requires that ‚a minimum of 
30 hours per week of constructive activity is scheduled for each prisoner.‛72  This policy is 
aimed at the normalisation of a prisoner’s behaviour and it is an attempt, according to the pri-
son, to ‚model the community’s expectations of law abiding citizens, through the requirement 
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that prisoner participate in work, programs, learning, recreation and other pro-social 
activity.‛73  The ‚W-IV Prisoner Activity Timetable coordinates the elements of Who (Pri-
soner), What (Activity), Where (Venue) and When (Prisoner Day timeslots),‛ hence ‚W-IV.‛74  
The W-IV Timetable locks in every hour of a prisoner’s day to enforce non-idleness through a 
mix of therapeutic treatment, education/training, work and recreation.  Attendance at each al-
located session is validated on the W-IV database by a member of the custodial, clinical, 
educational or health care staff.  If attendance is not validated, then the small weekly gratuity 
a prisoner receives can be reduced as a penalty.  The prisoner is not responsible, but rather 
obligated, and that obligation is validated as having been met by members of staff twice a day.  
All activity is logged: Case Management sessions; Education sessions; Work sessions; Neigh-
bourhood sessions; Clinical services/health sessions; Clinical services/psych well-being ses-
sions; Neighbourhood clinical sessions for programs, and so on.75  If a prisoner does not attend 
or demonstrates ‚reportable lateness,‛ the particular ‚Activity Facilitator‛ is required to 
‛generate an Exception Report‛ that will ‚be viewable against the prisoner’s attendance re-
cords and details the nature of the Exception.‛76  The Case Manager or Unit Supervisor then 
decides if any action should be taken against the prisoner.   
 At this point some comparisons need to be considered from the history in Discipline and 
Punish to the specific examples at Marngoneet that I have explored here.  Disciplinary power 
starts with an ‚objectification of the crime and of the criminal;‛ the criminal is ‚abnormal‛ and 
is best managed if he or she is thought to belong ‚to a scientific objectification,‛ that is one 
which is amenable to ‚‘treatment that is correlative to it.‛77  With all scientific objectification 
comes classification and ‚the criminal as an individual [needs] to be known according to 
specific criteria,‛ and the ‚‘scientific interrogation [is aimed at discovering] what this [person] 
that one is punishing really is.‛78 Once established as a type of ‚enemy‛ of society and a pa-
thology, the offender can be treated so as to be ‚re-educated into social life.‛79  So once 
classified as a type according to specific criteria, but while still remaining an individual, the re-
educational treatment can be applied.  The way to achieve such a project is instrumentally 
through the schedule, regulation and control.  And of course, ‚work is a cornerstone of con-
trol.  To this end:  
 
Work was obligatory...  and for the work done, the prisoners received wages.  A strict time-
table, a system of prohibitions and obligations, continual supervision, exhortations, reli-
gious readings, a whole complex of methods ‘to draw towards good’ and ‘to tum away 
from evil’ held the prisoners in its grip from day to day.80  
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This policy objective is taken from the theory of the Rasphuis of Amsterdam, which was ope-
ned in 1596.  Michel Foucault says that Rasphuis of Amsterdam is a ‚basic figure‛ that ‚forms 
a link between the theory, so characteristic of the sixteenth century, of a pedagogical and 
spiritual transformation of individuals brought about by continuous exercise, and the peniten-
tiary techniques conceived in the second half of the eighteenth century.‛81  I would add to this 
‛and which is explicitly and faithfully manifested in the twenty-first century praxis at Mam-
goneet.‛ The ‚useful pedagogy‛ of the prison  
 
would revive for the lazy individual a liking for work, force him back into a system of 
interests in which labour would be more advantageous than laziness, form around him a 
small, miniature, simplified, coercive society in which the maxim, ‘he who wants to live 
must work’, would be clearly revealed.  Work would be compulsory, but so too would re-
muneration, which enables the prisoner to improve his lot during and after detention.82  
 
The so called ‚Philadelphia model‛ followed suit with the very same ideas with the opening 
of the Walnut Street Prison in 1790; ‚life was partitioned, therefore, according to an absolutely 
strict time-table, under constant supervision; each moment of the day was devoted to a 
particular type of activity, and brought with it its own obligations and prohibitions;‛ for the 
underlying principle of the timetable is ‚non-idleness; it is forbidden to waste time‛ as that 
would be ‚a moral offence and economic dishonesty.‛83  Describing the arrangements for em-
ploying and remunerating the prisoners at Walnut Street, they would be ‚constantly em-
ployed on productive works... they were not left idle and they were able to save a little money 
for the time their captivity would cease.‛84  The evidence demonstrates that there are direct 
correlations between these well-known early examples and theories shaping the development 
of disciplinary power that Michel Foucault reveals, and the contemporary praxis at Mam-
goneet confirms.   
 So, is the Foucauldian conception of disciplinary power still at work in contemporary 
forms of imprisonment?  Fred Alford said that he cannot find any of the main elements of dis-
ciplinary power as Michel Foucault frames it in omnipresent ‚surveillance, categorisation, 
classification, the time-table, [and] non-idleness.‛85  Despite Fred Alford’s claim, the policies of 
the Rasphuis’ of Amsterdam, which was opened in 1596 and the Walnut Street Prison of 1790, 
are indistinguishable on every level from Marngoneet in relation to: 
 
the establishment of a discourse of specific norms;  
 
the biographical fixing of the offender in the sentencing comments;  
 
the examination, classification and the categorization;  
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the registration and the extensive documentation which establishes the individual person as 
a ‘case’;  
 
individualizing treatment and training which relies on the most sound and recent  
 
theoretical/scientific knowledge; and  
 
the role of work, the gratuity received and the compulsory savings to aid the prisoner on 
release.   
 
All of these points are explicitly manifested in the operation of the Marngoneet Correctional 
Centre from its opening in March 2006 to the present.  Michel Foucault’s conception of disci-
plinary power provides a concise model for the operational philosophy of Marngoneet.  At 
Marngoneet, what is wrong in behaviour is now firmly conceptualised as a pathology, a thing 
to be addressed by people trained in health and behaviour sciences.  The Self has become 
mediated by health professionals just as Michel Foucault conceived of in Discipline and Punish.  
The mediating role that was once filled by the church in relation to a sense of Self (the soul) 
and Other, has been taken over by a professional class of administrators of human behaviour 
who have the knowledge and the management techniques to guide and mediate a re-concep-
tualising of Self through the therapeutic culture of the criminal justice system.  In other words, 
the prison, as it is represented at Marngoneet, has unambiguously become ‚a machine for al-
tering minds.‛86  Punishment is now a system that is aimed at addressing ‚the emotionally la-
den Self,‛ as Charles Sykes puts this shift from the spiritual to the secular in defining right and 
wrong in his A Nation of Victims: The Decay of the American Character.87  The Case and Treat-
ment Mangers who ‚treat‛ the prisoners, have, as James Nolan and Saundra Davis Westervelt 
put it, become a new ‚priestly‛ like class.88  
 The Foucauldian conception of disciplinary power is sometimes seen as a dry instru-
ment, a flowchart and a timetable on a parched document found in an archive.89  I argue that 
the sense of Self which emerges from disciplinary power is not in the least bit desiccated, for 
what disciplinary power operates on is the wet centre of Self, the mind.  And what is given ef-
fect to at Marngoneet is a changing conception of Self.  Even in resisting disciplinary power, 
the delinquents at Marngoneet have taken on judgment about Others and subverted the in-
clusive and common ground of ‚Neighbourhoods‛ to become sites of differentiation of their 
Self from that Other.  This oppositional ontology of a carceral subjectivity can be manifested in 
violent crimes, thus the need to ‚protect‛ those delinquents in the sex offender treatment 
Neighbourhood from the other, less abnormal delinquents. 
 The situation as it can be found at Marngoneet Correctional Centre bears all the phy-
siological and administrative characteristics of disciplinary power which were predicted by 
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Michel Foucault.  Every managerial aspect of the prison, and the mind of the delinquent, is tar-
geted for a controlled animation by a specialised staff that carries out an endless examination 
and accumulation of knowledge, all so the prison can function as ‚a social and medico-
psychological service‛ just as Michel Foucault claimed.90  So, from the Rasphuis of Amsterdam 
in 1596 to the Walnut Street Prison in 1790 and finally to Marngoneet, Michel Foucault has 
shown how this present came to be in relationship to the military/medical disciplinary ma-
nagement of the town or city under plague.  The operational philosophy of Marngoneet con-
firms without any doubt, that ‚word for word, from one century to the Other, the same fun-
damental propositions are repeated.‛91  The Foucauldian conception of disciplinary power is 
still at work in contemporary forms of imprisonment, at least at Marngoneet.  And impor-
tantly, the subjectivity of the person who offended against the will of the sovereign in pre-
modern times is so very different from the sense of Self of the criminal/offender/delinquent as 
he is presently found at Mamgoneet.  There is no element of the pre-modern in conception of 
the offender and incarnation of ‛Marngoneet Man.‛ Michel Foucault suggested that disci-
plinary power would lead to a line of descent which would eventually lead to ‛homo criminalis 
becom[ing] a definite object in the field of knowledge,‛ but he said we would ‚have to wait a 
long time‛ for this genotype to appear; of course we wait no longer.92  
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